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In an age in which the government can see through walls with
"night vision,"' electromagnetic detection devices,2 and other ad-
vanced technology,3 privacy rights are once again under attack.
Police use thermal imaging devices to detect the "heat signatures"
of our bodies and other sources in our homes; yet, a number of
federal circuit courts have held that such intrusion is not a Fourth
Amendment "search," and thus does not require a warrant:4 the
intrusion takes place without case-by-case judicial review, and
1. See, eg., Janice Fioravante, Night Sight, INvESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Feb. 26,
1995, at A6 ("[Night vision] technology is gaining acceptance in public safety applications
such as law enforcement, drug interdiction, search and rescue, as well as industrial mar-
kets.").
2. See Anna-Maria Goossens, New Security Solution in Works, DAILY HAMPSHIRE
GAZETIE, July 27, 1996, at 9 (describing recent surveillance technology capable of "read-
ing" electromagnetic radiation).
3. See Max Glaskin, Detector Frisks From a Distance, SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Feb. 26, 1995 ("[T]he new [thermal imaging] device does not need to bathe the subject
in radiation so anyone, anywhere can be 'frisked' unknowingly, either by a fixed machine
or one held by hand . . . . The technology even has the ability to penetrate many com-
mon building materials and allow remote observation of people within a room."); Earl
Lane, High-Tech Weapons For Cops, NEWSDAY, Aug. 2, 1994, at B25 (describing other
high-technology equipment being employed by local police forces, including "smart guns"
that will not fire for unauthorized users; "sniffers" that detect the presence of bullets in
a building, automated booking stations to process arrestees; computerized criminal history
systems; and acoustic sensors that rapidly detect, recognize and pinpoint the location of
gunfire).
4. See, eg., United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
213 (1995). However, when government conduct constitutes a "search" within the Fourth
Amendment, "[t]he Supreme Court has long expressed a strong preference for searches
made pursuant to a search warrant, and on occasion has even asserted 'that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures."'
YALE KAMISAR ET AL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 224 (8th ed. 1994) (citations
omitted).
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individuals are left without constitutional protection from indis-
criminate and arbitrary police conduct.5 As a sign of things to
come, the Baltimore Police Department is currently scheduling im-
plementation of Millivision, a passive device that perceives elec-
tromagnetic energy emitted by the body.6 The technology allows
its user to "see" through clothing and walls to detect whether an
individual is carrying weapons, drugs, or other objects.' This Note
argues that, in response to law enforcement's use of these new
technologies, courts must reexamine Fourth Amendment doctrine
with regard to government surveillance.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particular-
ly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.'
Early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was constructed around
property rights, protecting individuals from physical trespass9 by
government agents in certain "constitutionally protected area[s].' '10
The standard provided adequate protection against "hands-on,"
physical searches." However, over time the same evaluation has
.5. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
The judicial warrant has a significant role to play in that it provides the de-
tached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement offi-
cer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Once a
lawful search has begun, it is also far more likely that it will not exceed proper
bounds when it is done pursuant to a judicial authorization "particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." Further, a
warrant assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the law-
ful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his
power to search.
Id. (citations omitted).
6. See Jennifer Tanaka & N'gai Croal, A New Way to Spot Weapons, NEWSWEEK,
July 31, 1995, at 8.
7. See id. at 8.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See, eg., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463, 466 (1928) (holding that
a police wiretap was not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment because the interception
was accomplished without physical entry upon defendant's premises).
10. See, eg., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510, 512 (1961) (holding that
eavesdropping accomplished by means of an electronic device that penetrated premises
occupied by petitioner was a violation of Fourth Amendment).
11. See id. at 509-10 ("[Ejavesdropping accomplished by means of . . . a physical
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proven inadequate to address concerns about developing surveil-
lance techniques'2 that are physically unintrusive."
The Court initially responded to the advent of more powerful
surveillance methods by shifting away from its property rights
reasoning. In Katz v. United States,'4 the Court announced that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 5 From Katz
forward, the Court decided, an individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy would govern whether or not a particular government
activity constitutes a "search" within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment. 6 Despite this attempt to respond to advancing tech-
nology, 7 subsequent decisions have revealed an unwillingness on
the part of the Court to apply this constitutional scrutiny to newer,
more powerful governmental surveillance techniques. 8
Moreover, recent Supreme Court cases demonstrate a refine-
ment. The Court is beginning to conduct a new inquiry-an inqui-
intrusion" without a warrant amounts to an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights).
12. As early as 1928, Justice Brandeis warned against the future implications of
adopting a "physical trespass" interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as technology
advanced:
In the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be. The progress of science in furnishing the Gov-
ernment with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways
may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing pa-
pers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Ad-
vances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unex-
pressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. "That places the liberty of every man in
the hands of every petty officer" was said by James Otis of much lesser intru-
sions than these. To Lord Camden a far slighter intrusion seemed "subversive
of all the comforts of society." Can it be that the Constitution affords no pro-
tection against such invasions of individual security?
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 247 (1986) (Powell, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard was designed to ensure that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect privacy
in an era when official surveillance can be accomplished without any physical intrusion).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. See iL at 351.
16. See id. at 361. The actual test has two requirements: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. See id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. See, e.g., Dow, 476 U.S. at 239 (holding that the taking of aerial photographs
with a precise and expensive camera of the industrial complex of a chemical company
was not a "search" governed by the Fourth Amendment); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that the use of a pen register by a telephone company does
not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also infra
notes 41-62 and accompanying text.
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ry ex post into the content of the information revealed by surveil-
lance-instead of the manner in which the information has been
obtained. 9 Although the Court still putatively adheres to the
Katz standard, much of its recent reasoning seems to be based on
the Court's belief that certain government activities are not
searches because the "intimate details" of individuals' lives are not
revealed in the process.' Without further defining these "intimate
details," the federal circuit courts have seized this reasoning2' and
have proposed that whether government surveillance has revealed
"intimate details" should be the "crucial inquiry" in determining
whether Fourth Amendment protection is available.'
This Note argues that the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to
adopt this "intimate details" standard, dramatically altering the
balance between the government's interest in effective surveillance
and citizens' privacy rights. New, physically-unintrusive yet ex-
tremely revealing government surveillance techniques will not be
considered "searches" and, as a result, individuals will be deprived
of Fourth Amendment protection from such government conduct.
19. See, eg., Dow, 476 U.S. 227; supra note 13 and accompanying text.
20. See, eg., Dow, 476 U.S. at 238 ("[The photographs at issue] are not so revealing
of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns."); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 215 n.3 (1986) ("[A]erial observation of curtilage may become invasive, either due to
physical intrusiveness or through modern technology which discloses to the senses those
intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow
citizens."); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (When a helicopter flew at 400 feet
over respondent's curtilage, there was no evidence in the record that "intimate details
connected with the use of [his] home or curtilage were observed."). Curtilage includes
"those out-buildings which are directly and intimately connected with the habitation and
in proximity thereto and the land or grounds surrounding the dwelling which are neces-
sary and convenient and habitually used for family purposes and carrying on domestic
employment." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990).
21. See, eg., United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir.) (holding that a
warrantless use of a thermal imager did not violate the Fourth Amendment (citing Dow,
476 U.S. at 238)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992,
996 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)) (holding
that defendant did not have a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in heat which
was vented from his mobile home and which was detected by infrared thermal images).
22. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855; Ford, 34 F.3d at 996 (citing Riley, 488 U.S. at 452);
see also United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir.) (holding that thermal
imagery is not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 684 (1995); United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that determination of whether use of thermal imaging device to scan defendant's
residence was a search required remand for findings on technical capacity of device);
United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant's
subjective expectation of privacy in heat emanating from his house was not one that
society would find objectively reasonable).
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Furthermore, because of the surreptitious nature of many new
surveillance techniques, individuals will be unaware when the
techniques are in use, and thus will be unable to detect or prevent
government abuse. The checks on government surveillance that
previously had limited government intrusion into our private lives
will be severely reduced, and much that individuals have long
considered private will be open to arbitrary and capricious police
inspection.
Part I of this Note discusses the development of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence regarding "searches," and recognizes the
implicit adoption of an "intimate details" test in response to
emerging technological advances. Part II discusses one such tech-
nological advance, thermal imaging, and reviews the federal circuit
courts' explicit use of the "intimate details" standard in determin-
ing whether use of that technology constitutes a "search" under
the Fourth Amendment. Part III attempts to develop a working
definition of "intimate details" and discusses the constitutionality
of warrantless use of Millivision, a new, highly-powerful surveil-
lance technology, in light of this definition. Part III concludes that
warrantless Millivision scans and other high technology surveillance
techniques are unlikely to be considered "searches" under the
Fourth Amendment. Part IV refocuses on the "intimate details"
standard itself, and argues that it is flawed: the standard is ill-
defined and overly-generous to police surveillance techniques.
Because the "intimate details" standard appears to be the Court's
current response to emerging physically-unintrusive surveillance
techniques, and because it is not amenable to principled limitation,
Part IV argues that new restraints need to be applied to balance
the interests of law enforcement and the individual. To achieve
that goal, this Note offers two proposals: 1) limiting the capacity
of the technology; and 2) placing the burden of proof on the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that the "search" revealed no "intimate
details."
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment provides direct protection from "un-
reasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests."'
23. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
57919961
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The drafters of the Bill of Rights adopted the Fourth Amendment
against the backdrop of the arbitrary and abusive system of Writs
of Assistance used by tax collectors and other governmental offi-
cials in colonial times.' This practice is undoubtedly the historical
reason that warrantless searches are presumed unreasonablez un-
less they fall into one of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment.' A prerequisite to invoking the protection of the amend-
ment, however, is that the government activity in question consti-
tute a search.27 The Supreme Court has struggled to define the
term "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes. Early decisions
held that a government activity only constituted a search if the
government physically trespassed on certain "constitutionally pro-
tected areas."'
24. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7-8 (stating that the Fourth Amendment "grew in
large measure out of the colonists' experience with Writs of Assistance"); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-29 (1886) (stating that the Framers' colonial experience with
Writs of Assistance informed their conception of what was meant by unreasonable
searches and seizures).
25. Se4 e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) ("This fundamental right
is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued
by an independent judicial officer."); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627 ("Such is the power, and,
therefore, one would expect the law to warrant [general searches] should be clear in
proportion as the power is exorbitant.").
26. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
[T]he warrant requirement [has] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is]
basically unrecognizable. In 1985, one commentator cataloged nearly 20 such ex-
ceptions, including "searches incident to arrest ... automobile searches...
border searches . . . administrative searches of regulated businesses . . . exigent
circumstances . . . search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause
to arrest . . . boat boarding for document checks ... welfare searches ..
inventory searches . . . airport searches . . . [and] school search[es]."
Id. (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MiCH. L. REV.
1468, 1473-74 (1984)).
27. See Maryland v. Macan, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (holding that absent a search
or seizure, Fourth Amendment safeguards do not apply); see also, e.g., Anthony G. Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974)
(noting that "[l]aw enforcement practices are not required by the Fourth Amendment to
be reasonable unless they are either 'searches' or 'seizures"').
28. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963) (upholding the admissibility
of an electronic recording of petitioner's conversation, and noting that there was no un-
lawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area); see also Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 510, 512 (1961) (holding the actions of police officers in attaching a
"spike mike" to a heating duct of house used by defendants violated the Fourth Amend-
ment because it was accomplished through unauthorized physical penetration into the
premises occupied by the petitioners); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466
(1928) (holding that, because a wiretap did not involve entry into the defendant's house,
its use did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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The belief that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals
from more than just physical searches has existed for more than a
century. 9 That belief is currently embodied in Katz v. United
States." In Katz, Government agents had attached an electronic
listening device to a public telephone booth from which the peti-
tioner had placed a call 1 The contents of this call were part of
the state's case, in which the petitioner was convicted of transmit-
ting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal
statute. 2 The Court decided that the conversation overheard by
the government agents should have been suppressed at trial as the
fruits of an illegal search3 3 In Katz, the Court overturned the
premise that property interests control the right of government to
search and seize,' 4 holding instead that the Fourth Amendment
"protects people, not places."'35
The primary inquiry under Justice Harlan's concurring analysis
in Katz, which has become the controlling Fourth Amendment
test,3 6 is whether an individual's expectation of privacy is one that
society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 7 If the Court finds
the expectation to be reasonable, the government activity is
deemed a "search," and unless the government had a warrant or
the "search" fell into one of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment,31 the evidence obtained in the search is inadmissible at tri-
al39 However, if the Court finds the expectation is not objectively
reasonable, the Fourth Amendment is held not to apply, and any
evidence garnered from the search is admissible.4 Thus, the cru-
29. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (1886) ("[It is not the breaking of [Petitioner's]
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and pri-
vate property").
30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
31. See id. at 348.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 359.
34. See id. at 353 (holding that "the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure").
35. Id. at 351.
36. See, eg., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230, 236 (1986).
37. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. For an account of such exceptions, see supra note 26.
39. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (reversing defendant's conviction, based on trial court's
admission of illegally seized conversation).
40. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 45 (1988) (reversing trial court's sup-
pression of evidence because the seizure did not infringe a reasonable expectation of
1996]
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cial determination is the definition of reasonableness of the
defendant's expectation of privacy.
Since Katz, several decisions have shed some light on how the
Court determines when an individual has a "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy," or, in other words, when specific government
conduct constitutes a "search" deserving of Fourth Amendment
scrutiny.41 In Smith v. Maryland,' the Court held that the use of
a pen register43 by the phone company upon the request of police
did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.' The Court analyzed the pen register under the
Katz standard and held that the individual in question had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed.4' By
the Court's reasoning, the fact that individuals voluntarily convey
phone numbers to the telephone company dictates the conclusion
that those individuals forfeit any expectation of privacy they other-
wise might have had in the subject matter.46 Also important in
the Court's reasoning was the inability of the pen register to re-
flect the contents of communications.47 The Court compared the
phone numbers revealed by the police in this case with the con-
versation seized in Katz and concluded the two were deserving of
different treatment.48
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, found the situation in Smith
similar to Katz and further asserted that the petitioner's expecta-
tion of privacy was one that society would deem reasonable.49 He
privacy).
41. See, eg., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
42. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
43. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls
are actually completed." Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434
U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
44. See iL at 745-46.
45. See id. at 743 ("[E]ven if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that
the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not 'one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967))).
46. See id. at 742-43.
47. See id. at 741.
48. See id. The Court noted that the pen register does not disclose the content of
any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, or
whether the call was even completed. See id.
49. See ia at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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declined to follow the majority's opinion that only the content of
communications was protected:
I doubt there are any [telephone subscribers] who would be
happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long
distance numbers they have called. This is not because such a list
might in some sense be incriminating, but because it easily could
reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and
thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life s°
This was the first time a member of the Court used the phrase
"intimate details" in the context of the Fourth Amendment. Justice
Stewart concluded by noting that "the broad and unsuspected
governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electron-
ic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amend-
ment safeguards."'"
The first appearance of the "intimate details" rationale in a
majority opinion occurred in Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,52 where the Court held that aerial photography of a chemi-
cal company's industrial complex was not a "search" for Fourth
Amendment purposes. 3 Here again, the Court analyzed the gov-
ernmental conduct and determined that the petitioner did not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the open areas of the indus-
trial complex.54 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
distinguished the covered buildings and offices in the complex, in
which Dow had a legitimate expectation of privacy, from the re-
mainder of the complex and concluded, "[t]he intimate activities
associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage sim-
ply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures
and buildings of a manufacturing plant.""5
Although Dow had gone to great lengths to maintain "elabo-
rate security" at the complex, it did not conceal all of its manufac-
turing equipment from aerial view.56 The Court stressed that the
50. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). Justice Marshall, in a separate dissent, noted the chill-
ing effect that such an invasion could have on political affiliations, a free press, and oth-
er "hallmark[s]" of a true democracy. See id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
53. See id. at 239.
54. See i&
55. See id. at 236.
56. See id. at 229.
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EPA aircraft was lawfully within navigable airspace when it photo-
graphed the complex, and therefore the government was not physi-
cally trespassing on Dow's property.17 Also pivotal to the case's
outcome was the Court's view that the EPA was not using a
unique sensory device, but rather a camera, albeit an extremely
precise and expensive one, and that the photographs taken
"[were] not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitution-
al concerns."59
Thus, the majority again defined the constitutionality of the
government surveillance by the subject matter revealed. The Court
held that if the government's actions could record conversations,
see inside buildings, or reveal other intimate details, the "search"
might come within the ambit of Fourth Amendment protection.6
In his dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, vigorously argued that although the majority did
not explicitly reject the application of the Katz standard, the
majority's decision could not be reconciled with that precedent.61
Justice Powell further asserted that Dow did have an expectation
of privacy throughout its complex that society was prepared to
recognize as reasonable."
In California v. Ciraolo,3 decided the same day as Dow, the
Court held that warrantless aerial observation of a fenced-in back-
57. The majority cited Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984), for the prop-
osition that the "public and police lawfully may survey land from the air." Id at 238.
However, as Justice Powell's dissenting opinion pointed out, "[t]he Court's holding that
the warrantless photography does not constitute an unreasonable search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment is based on the absence of any physical trespass-a theory
disapproved in a line of cases beginning with the decision in Katz v. United States." Id.
at 252 (Powell, J. dissenting).
58. See id. at 238. The majority distinguished the standard floor-mounted, precision
aerial mapping camera used by the Environmental Protection Agency in the instant case
from highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public. See
id. However, as Justice Powell recognized, "[t]he Court holds that Dow had no reason-
able expectation of privacy from surveillance accomplished by means of a $22,000 map-
ping camera, but that it does have a reasonable expectation of privacy from satellite
surveillance and photography. This type of distinction is heretofore wholly unknown in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 250 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 238. The federal circuit courts frequently cite this language when upholding
physically unintrusive government surveillance. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d
992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 1994).
60. See Dow, 476 U.S. at 238-39.
61. See id. at 244-47 (Powell, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 248-49.
63. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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yard within the curtilage of a home was not a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment.' For the Court, the test of legitimacy under
Katz did not depend on whether an individual chooses to conceal
an assertedly private activity, but rather whether the government's
intrusion infringes upon the values protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 65 The Court acknowledged that "aerial observation
of curtilage may become invasive, either due to physical intrusive-
ness or through modem technology which discloses to the senses
those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imper-
ceptible to police or fellow citizens. ' 66 The majority concluded,
however, that no such details were revealed in the instant case,
and therefore that the petitioner could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.67
Writing for the same four justices dissenting in Dow, Justice
Powell described the "indiscriminate nature" of the surveillance;
the photographs revealed not only respondent's curtilage, but his
house and the houses and yards of his neighbors.68 Justice Powell
again admonished the Court that modem technology poses an
increasing threat to the individual's personal freedoms and liber-
ties.69 Justice Powell argued that the majority's opinion strayed
from the standard established in Katz: "It is not easy to believe
that our society is prepared to force individuals to bear the risk of
64. See id. at 215.
65. See id. at 211-12.
66. Id. at 215 n.8 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14-15) (emphasis added).
67. See id. at 212-14.
68. See id. at 225 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Court's decision has serious implications for outdoor family activities con-
ducted in the curtilage of a home. The feature of such activities that makes
them desirable to citizens living in a free society, namely, the fact that they
occur in the open air and sunlight, is relied on by the Court as a justification
for permitting police to conduct warrantless surveillance at will. Aerial surveil-
lance is nearly as intrusive on family privacy as physical trespass into the curti-
lage. It would appear that, after today, families can expect to be free of official
surveillance only when they retreat behind the walls of their homes.
Id. at 225 n.10.
69. See id. at 226. Powell stated:
Rapidly advancing technology now permits police to conduct surveillance in the
home itself, an area where privacy interests are most cherished in our society,
without any physical trespass. While the rule in Katz was designed to prevent
silent and unseen invasions of Fourth Amendment privacy rights in a variety of
settings, we have consistently afforded heightened protection to a person's right
to be left alone in the privacy of his house. The Court fails to enforce that
right or to give any weight to the longstanding presumption that warrantless




this type of warrantless police intrusion into their residential ar-
eas."
70
The "intimate details" test next appeared in the Court's deci-
sion in California v. Greenwood.7' There the Court held that indi-
viduals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage
placed in opaque bags outside their houses for collection by the
sanitation department.72 The majority, using the Katz standard,
concluded that although the petitioner was adhering to a local
ordinance in disposing of his trash at the curb, he voluntarily
conveyed it to third parties such as "animals, children, scavengers,
[or] snoops."'73 The dissent argued that society should protect as
reasonable the petitioner's expectation of privacy because a "single
bag of trash" reveals the "intimate details" of an individual's
life.74
In the latest Supreme Court case to address the constitutional-
ity of warrantless government surveillance, the Court again used
the "intimate details" rationale, this time emphasizing that this
language was central to its holding. In Florida v. Riley,75 Justice
White wrote a plurality opinion that upheld the constitutionality of
a law enforcement officer's observation, with his naked eye, from
a helicopter circling at an altitude of 400 feet, of the interior of a
partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard.76 The
Court held that this surveillance did not constitute a "search" for
which a warrant was required.77 Even though the respondent had
surrounded his yard with wire fencing and had posted "Do Not
Enter" signs, and even though the greenhouse was "obscured from
view from surrounding property by trees, shrubs, and the mobile
home,"78 "no intimate details connected with the use of the home
or curtilage were observed,, 79 and therefore, the Court held, the
70. Id at 225 (footnote omitted).
71. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
72. See id. at 40-41.
73. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
74. Id at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Like rifling through desk drawers or inter-
cepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the target's financial and pro-
fessional status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts, personal relation-
ships, and romantic interests.").
75. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
76. See id at 450-51.
77. See id. at 450.




surveillance was not a "search" that violated his reasonable expec-
tation of privacy." What makes this decision so remarkable is
that the Court had previously considered the curtilage of one's
home as deserving the same paramount protection as the inside of
the home itself.8 Under the Court's holding in Riley, however, it
is apparent that the home is no longer afforded such blanket pro-
tection. Instead, what is "seen" will be determinative of the consti-
tutionality of the warrantless surveillance.
In a lengthy dissent in Riley, Justice Brennan asked "[w]hat,
one wonders, is meant by 'intimate details'?" He then pointed
out that the Fourth Amendment does not require that the activity
observed be "intimate" to deserve protection.8 These points high-
light the failure of the Court to sufficiently describe what "inti-
mate details" are and why they matter to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The plurality in Riley only refers to them
vaguely.' Smith, Dow, Ciraolo and Greenwood explain only what
they are not.8 Is one to suppose that an "intimate detail" is
apparent only in the way "obscenity" was pinned down by Justice
Stewart?86 Despite the lack of definition, in Riley an embrace of
the "intimate details" standard by at least a plurality of the Court
has become clear.
II. THERMAL IMAGING AND THE "INTIMATE DETAILS"
STANDARD
While the Supreme Court appears to be using the "intimate
details" language to determine the constitutionality of physically
unintrusive government surveillance techniques, it has failed to
define this standard clearly. The circuit courts have begun to pro-
vide this definition in cases that go beyond the kind of direct
visual surveillance found in Riley, especially those that consider the
80. See id. at 452.
81. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235-36 (1986).
82. Riley, 488 U.S. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. See iL at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If the Constitution does not protect
Riley's marijuana garden against such surveillance, it is hard to see how it will prohibit
the government from aerial spying on the activities of a law-abiding citizen on her fully
enclosed outdoor patio.").
84. See iL at 452 (stating only that "no intimate details ... were observed").
85. See supra notes 42-74 and accompanying text.
86. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (defining
obscenity: "I know it when I see it").
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government's warrantless use of thermal imaging technology.87
These lower courts have determined that the "crucial question" in
determining whether a government surveillance is constitutional is
whether "intimate details" are revealed.88 Instead of focusing
broadly on whether a person's expectation of privacy was objec-
tively reasonable, they have focused narrowly on the content of
what was observed.89 They have held that unless a particular gov-
ernment technology reveals a couple making love or some other
similarly "intimate" activity, it will not be considered a "search"
deserving of Fourth Amendment protection." This reasoning by
the circuit courts could have devastating effects on individuals'
privacy interests. Until the Supreme Court addresses this issue, the
"intimate details" test is law in these circuits. Thus, law enforce-
ment officers in these jurisdictions are permitted nearly unlimited
use of physically unintrusive surveillance techniques, and may
proceed, unchecked, to investigate homes and persons in highly
invasive ways.
A. Thermal Imaging Technology
"Thermal imagery" is the use of infrared detection equipment
to produce a visual image of an object from the heat it radiates.91
The image is created when the thermal imaging device converts
the thermal energy radiating from the object into a color on a
predetermined color scale.92 A screen then shows the object in
slightly less detail than a television picture,' 3 and shows which ob-
jects are radiating more or less heat than a baseline set by the
operator.94 To calibrate the device for a neighborhood sweep, the
87. See infra notes 104-42 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 75 (1995).
89. See, e.g., id.
90. See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that refer.
ence to the factual basis of the case, including whether "the device can detect sexual
activity in the bedroom," is required to determine if a thermal scan constitutes a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment).
91. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994). Thermal
imagers, relying on differences in radiant heat from objects, are distinct from the electro-
magnetic imaging used by Millivision and similar devices. See infra notes 174-88 and
accompanying text.





operator scans neighboring homes where the owners are not sus-
pected of criminal activity.95 The device is passive, that is, it does
not project beams or otherwise physically penetrate the objects
targeted.96 Neither the heat sources nor the infrared waves of
radiating heat are visible to the naked eye."
Thermal imagery has been used extensively in various military
actions, including most famously the Persian Gulf War, for military
combat applications such as weapons targeting.98 Presently, this
technology is gaining acceptance in various public safety applica-
tions.99 While there are a range of uses to which thermal imagery
can be put, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and local and
state police primarily use the device for profiling indoor marijuana
growing operations."° Whether using thermal imaging systems
built into airborne surveillance vehicles or hand-held units, agents
"look for hot spots that would indicate heat sources inside a build-
ing."'0' Such heat sources emanate from high intensity discharge
lights which generate heat of 150 degrees or more"~ and which
are necessary for indoor marijuana-growing operations. The results
of these thermal scans aid law enforcement in obtaining search
warrants for the premises. 3
B. Constitutionality of Warrantless Thermal Imaging "Searches"
Under the Fourth Amendment
All five Circuit Courts that have addressed the use of thermal
imaging devices without a search warrant have determined it to be
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment."° In each of these
95. See Washington v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 600 (Wash. 1994).
96. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522.
97. See id.; Young, 867 P.2d at 595.
98. See Fioravante, supra note 1, at A6; see also Lynne M. Pochurek, From the
Battlefront to the Homefron" Infrared Surveillance and the War On Drugs Place Privacy
Under Siege, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 137, 149 (1995). "The FLID [Forward Looking
Infrared Device] was designed to advance the United States' position in military combat.
This thermal imagery equipment enables its user to sense surface temperatures to 'see'
through darkness, haze or smoke." Id. (footnote omitted).
99. See Fioravante, supra note 1, at A6.
100. See Pochurek, supra note 98, at 150.
101. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522.
102. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 1994).
103. See, e.g., id. at 1058.
104. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct.
75 (1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct.
1996)
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cases, government agents used thermal imagers to detect the pres-
ence of hot spots that allegedly indicated that grow lights were
being operated to aid the cultivation of marijuana plants." And,
in each case, the agents used the results of the thermal scans as
support to obtain a search warrant for the defendants' premis-
es. °6 The various defendants moved to suppress the thermal im-
aging evidence on the grounds that the warrantless use of the
thermal imaging device was unconstitutional; thus, they argued, the
search warrant was invalid, and all its fruits should be excluded at
trial."°
The Eighth Circuit was the first to review the warrantless use
of thermal imagers. In United States v. Pinson,0's the court held
that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
by the government's use of the device."° The court reviewed the
case under the Katz analysis and concluded that, even if the de-
213 (1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994); Pinson, 24 F.3d at
1058-59; United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994). But see United States v.
Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1500-01 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th
Cir. 1996) (raising the possibility that thermal scans without a warrant violate the Fourth
Amendment and arguing that other circuit courts have "misfrarned" the Fourth Amend-
ment inquiry). For a more detailed analysis of the circuit courts' thermal imaging cases,
see Pochurek, supra note 98, at 151-59; Lisa Tuenge Hale, Comment, United States v.
Ford: The Eleventh Circuit Permits Unrestricted Police Use of Thermal Surveillance on
Private Property Without A Warrant, 29 GA. L. REV. 819 (1995); Susan Moore, Note,
Does Heat Emanate Beyond the Threshold?: Home Infrared Emissions, Remote Sensing,
and the Fourth Amendment Threshold, 70 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 803 (1994); Matthew L.
Zabel, Comment, A High-Tech Assault on the "Castle": Warrantless Thermal Surveillance
of Private Residences and the Fourth Amendment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 267, 282-287
(1995).
105. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851-52; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669; Ford, 34 F.3d at 993;
Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057-58; Kyllo, 37 F.3d at 528.
106. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851-52; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669; Ford, 34 F.3d at 993;
Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057-58; Kyllo, 37 F.3d at 528.
107. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1499; Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851-52; Myers, 46 F.3d at
669; Ford, 34 F.3d at 993; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to the states. See id. at
655. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained by violating a defendant's
constitutional rights may not be introduced by the prosection for the purposes of provid-
ing direct proof of the defendant's guilt. See id at 646-50. The Supreme Court has held,
however, that the rule is not required by the Constitution. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) ("Whether the exclusionary rule is appropriately imposed in
a particular case ... must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing
the use [of the defective evidence]."). Instead, it is a judicially-created method of deter-
ring violations of the Fourth Amendment. See KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 208-34.
108. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
109. See id. at 1059.
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fendant had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was not one
that society was prepared to recognize as "reasonable."" The
court likened the thermal scan to the warrantless use of police
dogs trained to sniff for and identify the presence of drugs,"'
upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Place." The
Eighth Circuit stated:
The detection of the heat waste was not an intrusion into the
home; no intimate details of the home were observed, and there
was no intrusion upon the privacy of the individuals within. None
of the interests which form the basis for the need for protection
of a residence, namely the intimacy, personal autonomy and
privacy associated with a home, are threatened by thermal imag-
ery."1
While not specifically referring to Dow,"4 it appears that the
Eighth Circuit was influenced by that decision and similar post-
Katz Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 5
Similarly, the defendant in United States v. Ford"6 contested
the admissibility of evidence obtained through a search of his
home." In this case, the warrant was partly based on the results
of a thermal scan conducted by police that revealed the defend-
ant's home was emitting an "inordinate amount of heat.""' The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendant did not have a sub-
jective expectation of privacy because he had taken intentional
steps to vent the heat that was detected by the thermal
110. See id. at 1058-59.
111. See id. at 1058.
112. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that the use of a police-trained dog in a public
place does not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment); see also
Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1508-09:
The dog sniff, like the thermal imager, extracts information about the interior
of an object solely from an analysis of external physical phenomena ....
[However, as] the imager lacks the precision of the dog sniff, we decline to
extend Place to allow the warrantless use of thermal imagers upon a home.
Id.
113. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059.
114. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
115. Like Dow and Katz, Pinson emphasized that the challenged search did not in-
trude upon any reasonable expectation of privacy. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59; see also
Dow, 476 U.S. at 238-39; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
116. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).




imager.119 Furthermore, the court said that even if Ford had a
subjective expectation of privacy, it was not one which society was
prepared to recognize as reasonable."2 The test of reasonable-
ness, explained the court, was determined by referring to the fun-
damental values of the Fourth Amendment. "One such value that
has emerged as a significant factor in the Court's Fourth Amend-
ment analysis is the intimacy of detail and activity that a sur-
veillance technique reveals in a particular case."'' The court cit-
ed Dow for the principle that even if sophisticated surveillance
equipment is used, unless the government activity reveals intimate
details, no warrant will be required by the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 2 The court then concluded that as far as the record re-
vealed, "no intimate details connected with the use of the home or
curtilage were observed," and that there was therefore no Fourth
Amendment violation) 2s
In United States v. Kyllo,124 the Ninth Circuit elaborated on
the "intimate details" standard developed by the Eleventh and
Eighth Circuits. In Kyllo, the defendant appealed the denial of a
motion to suppress all evidence found in a search of his resi-
dence.2' The warrant was again partly predicated on the results
of a thermal scan of his residence." The court remanded the
case to the district court for a factual determination of the techno-
logical capacity of the thermal imaging device."2 The court said
it needed a factual basis on which to determine whether the de-
fendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy." The district
court was directed to determine whether "on the one extreme, this
device can detect sexual activity in the bedroom,... or at the
other extreme, whether it can only detect hot spots where heat is
escaping from a structure."'29 The Ninth Circuit, like the Eighth
119. See id. at 995.
120. See iL
121. Id. at 996.
122. See id. (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986)).
123. See id. at 996-97 (quoting Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989)).
124. 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994).
125. See id. at 528.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 531.
128. See id. at 530-31.
129. Id. The court explained:
[We must decide whether Kyllo exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and
whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to acknowledge as rea-
sonable. But this inquiry cannot be conducted in the abstract. We must have
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Circuit, cited Dow for the now-familiar proposition that particular
warrantless government surveillance will only be unconstitutional if
it reveals "intimate details."' But the Ninth Circuit added a
twist: a requirement to investigate the capacity of the thermal
imaging device to reveal intimate details. Presumably, if the device
could reveal human forms and their activities, the court was pre-
pared to hold the "search" unconstitutional.1
3
'
On remand, the district court found that the use of the ther-
mal imaging device "was not an intrusion" into defendant's
home.1'3  The court found that "[n]o intimate details of the home
were observed, and there was no intrusion upon the privacy of the
individuals within the home.' '13  The district court made the fac-
tual finding that the thermal imaging device could not penetrate
the walls or windows to reveal conversations or human activi-
ties." 4 Therefore, at least in the context of the scope of the ther-
mal imaging used in Kyllo, the use of the technology is not a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the
Ninth Circuit.35
The next case to hold that a warrantless thermal scan of
defendant's home was not a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment came from the Seventh Circuit, which in Unit-
ed States v. Myers 6 relied on the "persuasive" reasoning of the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits in its decision.137 Citing Pinson, the
Myers court held that even if the defendant had a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy, society was not prepared to recognize that
some factual basis for gauging the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device,
which depends on the quality and the degree of detail of information that it
can glean.
ld. (citations omitted).
130. See id. at 531 n.3 (citing Dow, 476 U.S. at 238).
131. See id. at 530-31.
132. United States v. Kyllo, No. CR. 92-51-FR, 1996 WL 125594, at *2 (D. Or. Mar.
15, 1996).
133. Id. at *2.
134. See id.
135. See id. The factual findings of the district court involved the particular thermal
imaging device used by the Oregon National Guard in this particular case (the AGEMA
Thermovision 210). See id. Presumably, a different district court could find that a differ-
ent thermal imaging device can actually reveal "intimate details." However, it appears
that warrantless thermal imaging scans, in general, will not be held unconstitutional under
similar facts.
136. 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 213 (1995).
137. See id. at 669.
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expectation as reasonable because "[n]one of the interests which
form the basis for the need for protection of a residence, namely
the intimacy, personal autonomy and privacy associated with a
home, are threatened by thermal imagery."'138
Finally, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ishmael 39 con-
cluded that "[t]he crucial inquiry, as in any search and seizure
analysis, is whether the technology reveals 'intimate details '.. 140
and upheld a warrantless thermal scan of defendant's property. 41
The court specifically held that the thermal imager is acceptable
because it does not reveal intimate details within the structure
being scanned and therefore does not violate any Fourth Amend-
ment principles. 42
The only circuit to date to raise the possibility that a warrant-
less thermal scan could constitute a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes has been the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Cusu-
mano." In Cusumano, the initial panel decision compared the
"bug" at issue in Katz to the thermal scan used by police to de-
tect marijuana growing operations:"'
[T]he bug at issue in Katz was fixed to the outside of a public
phone booth. Reduced to its operational fundamentals, that bug
did not monitor the interior of the phone booth at all; rather, it
measured the molecular vibrations of the glass that encompassed
that interior. Alternatively, it might fairly be said that the bug
passively recorded the propagation of waste vibrational energy
into the public sphere. Drawing upon the logic embraced by our
fellow circuits, one could reason that the translation of the vibra-
tional record into an account of that which transpired within the
phone booth was simply a useful interpretation of abandoned
energy-an analysis which would, we note, approve the search
condemned by Katz."5
138. Id. at 670 (quoting United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994)).
139. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 75 (1995).
140. Id. at 855.
141. Id. (citing Dow, 476 U.S. at 238).
142. See id. at 856. ("[Tjhe device assesses only heat differentials in objects and there-
fore poses no threat to the privacy concerns that the Fourth Amendment is intended to
protect.").
143. 67 F.3d. 1497 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.
1996).




The panel stated that the Katz Court did not look at the devices
employed by the government nor the physical properties of the re-
corded information, but rather to the object of the government's
efforts. 46 Further, the panel suggested, the appropriate question
is not how capable a device is of revealing intimate details; the
question to be asked is whether the device was used to monitor an
activity in the home, a place deserving of the most exacting Fourth
Amendment protection. 47 However, on rehearing en banc,'41
the majoritY49 decided not to decide whether the use of a ther-
mal imager was a search under the Fourth Amendment because,
"absent any consideration of the information obtained from the
warrantless use of the thermal imager, the affidavit established
probable cause to support issuance of the search warrant."'
Thus, the issue of the constitutionality of the warrantless use of
thermal imaging remains technically unaddressed in the Tenth
Circuit.
All of the federal circuit courts that have definitively ad-
dressed the warrantless use of thermal imaging devices appear to
agree that this technology is not subject to Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. These courts have relied heavily on the dicta in Dow and
other post-Katz cases and therefore have considered the "crucial
question" to be whether the device reveals "intimate details."1''
In this attempt to flesh out the phrase "reasonable expectation of
privacy," a new definition of "search" for Fourth Amendment
purposes appears to be emerging.'52 Government surveillance is
only a "search," it seems, when that surveillance reveals "intimate
details." If certain government conduct, such as thermal imaging,
reveals these intimate details, it will generally have to be conduct-
ed pursuant to a warrant. If, on the other hand, the court deter-
mines that such details were not revealed, the activity does not
constitute a "search," and the Fourth Amendment standard does
146. See id. at 1502.
147. See id. at 1502-03 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984)); see
also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.").
148. United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
149. There were three dissenters in the decision. See id.
150. Id. at 1248.
151. See supra text accompanying note 140.
152. See supra notes 104-42 and accompanying text.
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not apply. Should the Supreme Court follow the circuit courts and
explicitly adopt this definition of "search," as it appears prepared
to do, 53 an increased government intrusion into private lives will
become an acceptable practice.
III. MILLIVISION AND THE "INTIMATE DETAILS" TEST
Millivision is one of many high technologies that can "search"
an individual without physical intrusion."M While this technology
may provide many advantages to law enforcement, it also raises
serious constitutional issues. The Supreme Court is at a crossroads
in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and its decisions on the
constitutionality of technologies like Millivision will largely deter-
mine the scope of permissible government investigation into
individuals' private lives. Instead of focusing on objective expecta-
tions, the Court now examines the subject matter revealed by the
surveillance. If what is "seen" is deemed by the Court to be "inti-
mate," the surveillance will be considered a search and will be
subject to the warrant requirement; if what is "seen" is not "inti-
mate," the surveillance can be conducted without judicial scrutiny.
There are many dangers inherent in this method of reviewing
government conduct, especially in light of the surreptitious nature
of the technology. Foremost among these is that without a work-
ing definition of "intimate details," law enforcement officers will
not know the acceptable parameters of their activities; neither will
individuals know what to expect. Individuals also will be unaware
of the existence of the surveillance and ignorant of government
abuses. Defining what "intimate details" are, therefore, will be the
first step in determining the scope of permissible surveillance.
153. Although there is no precedential value in decisions by the Court to decline
petitions for certiorari, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has declined to review
three of the four circuit court decisions discussed supra. See United States v. Myers, 116
S. Ct. 213 (1995) (denying certiorari review); United States v. Ishmael, 116 S. Ct. 75
(1995) (same); United States v. Pinson 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994) (same). No petition for
certiorari was filed in United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994); the issue in
United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994) was remanded to the lower court,
with no possibility yet for Supreme Court review.
154. See infra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
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A. The "Intimate Details" Standard Defined
The threshold question raised by the "intimate details" test is
the one posed by Justice Brennan in Riley: "What, one wonders, is
meant by 'intimate details'?""5 In order to define "intimate de-
tails," one must refer back to the text of the Fourth Amendment
and its interpretation by the Court. In his dissenting opinion in
California v. Ciraolo,5 6 Justice Powell recalled that the Fourth
Amendment "reflects a choice that our society should be one in
which citizens 'dwell in reasonable security and freedom from sur-
veillance."" 7 Justice Powell stated:
While no single consideration has been regarded as dispositive,
"the Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of
the Framers of the Fourth Amendment,... the uses to which
the individual has put a location .... and our societal under-
standing that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protec-
tion from government invasion."'
However, if the "intimate details" test is formally adopted by
the Court, it is difficult to see how the privacy interests cited by
Justice Powell can be protected. The "intimate details" standard
removes from the analysis any consideration of how and where the
government is conducting its surveillance. Instead, the analysis
focuses on the particular subject matter being "searched.""' 9 It
appears from the jurisprudence of the Court that the fact that the
search takes place in and around a home, previously a place de-
serving of the utmost privacy, is no longer the important factor in
the analysis. 6 Rather, the government could conduct surveil-
lance without warrant in any location, so long as it only found
items that would not be considered "intimate details."' 6' Addi-
155. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
157. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948)).
158. Id. at 220 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984)).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
160. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 458-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the conse-
quence of the plurality's analysis is that Fourth Amendment rights are infringed only if
police surveillance "interferes with the use of the backyard as a garden spot," id. at 463,
presuming that the police performing the surveillance were within their rights in being
where they were).
161. See, eg., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
use of a thermal imager did not constitute a "search" because no intimate details were
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tionally, the test has been applied even if the surveillance technol-
ogy at issue had the capability of revealing these "intimate de-
tails," unless the individual could prove that the particular warrant-
less government surveillance actually revealed such details, the
surveillance would be constitutionally permissible. 62 This result
contravenes the basic premise of the Fourth Amendment and the
Court's holding in Katz.1" Nevertheless, this is unquestionably
the direction the Court has been taking in its decisions since
Katz.164
In Florida v. Riley,1" a plurality of the Court said that po-
lice could "search" the curtilage of an individual's home from the
air,6 as long as the "search" did not reveal any "intimate de-
tails." 67 While the Court had previously considered the curtilage
of one's property deserving of the same protection as the home
itself,"r the Court declined to extend this protection to the
plaintiff because no "intimate details" were revealed. 69 Again
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, posed a relevant question: "If the
police had observed Riley embracing his wife in the backyard
greenhouse, would we then say that his reasonable expectation of
privacy had been infringed?' 170
A hypothetical similar to that discussed by Justice Brennan
would reveal another absurd result. What would the Court con-
clude if the helicopter in Riley had looked through a skylight in
the bedroom ceiling to find marijuana plants growing at the bed-
side? Because both the curtilage and the home itself have been
extended similar privacy expectations, presumably the Court, con-
revealed).
162. See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 455 (holding that police conduct was not a search
when no intimate details were actually observed).
163. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 243-44 (1986) (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that the majority's opinion to
permit aerial photographs of an industrial plant does not square with the decision in
Katz).
164. See supra notes 41-86 and accompanying text.
165. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
166. While the search in Riley actually revealed the curtilage of the property, the Su-
preme Court has considered the curtilage deserving of the same protection as the house.
See id. at 452 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
167. See iL (emphasizing the importance of curtilage in Fourth Amendment doctrine
as an area intimately linked to the home).
168. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
169. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 455.
170. Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sistent with its prior holdings, would allow the government to
"peek" through the skylight as long as the helicopter was in a
place where it could legally be.' According to this reasoning,
because the bedroom was left exposed via the skylight to anybody
who wanted to hover over the house, one has lost any expectation
of privacy. However, if while the government was looking through
the skylight to see the marijuana plants, they observed the resi-
dents making love, or writing in a diary, or reading certain books,
or other "intimate details" of one's life, the search would, under a
literal reading of Riley, be unconstitutional.
This hypothetical is only one of countless imaginable hypo-
theticals that leave one feeling somewhat insecure about the ability
to protect one's privacy from arbitrary and indiscriminate govern-
ment surveillance. It is important to note that, although the defen-
dant in Riley was "suspected" of growing marijuana, the Court's
holding allows the police to search any yard, regardless of whether
or not they suspect an individual of criminal activity. 72 As Jus-
tice Brennan stated in his dissent:
The principle enunciated in this case determines what limits the
Fourth Amendment imposes on aerial surveillance of any person,
for any reason. If the Constitution does not protect Riley's mari-
juana garden against such surveillance, it is hard to see how it
will prohibit the government from aerial spying on the activities
of a law-abiding citizen on her fully enclosed outdoor patio.173
171. See id. at 450 ("The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police trav-
eling in the public airways at [a low] altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe
what is visible to the naked eye." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
172. See id. at 450-52. It is hard to sympathize with criminals caught red-handed with
contraband-the occasional suppression of illegally obtained evidence leaves a bad taste
in our mouths. The Fourth Amendment, however, exists to protect all individuals.
"[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the
criminality of a few to protect the privacy of us all." Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329
(1987). As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Riley,
It is indeed easy to forget, especially in view of current concern over drug
trafficking, that the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection does not turn
on whether the activity disclosed by a search is illegal or innocuous. But we
dismiss this as a "drug case" only at the peril of our own liberties. Justice
Frankfurter once noted that "[i]t is a fair summary of history to say that the
safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not
very nice people," United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (dissent-
ing opinion), and nowhere is this observation more apt than in the area of the
Fourth Amendment, whose words have necessarily been given meaning largely
through decisions suppressing evidence of criminal activity.
488 U.S. at 463-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




Millivision is a new surveillance technology that uses passive
imaging technology to read the electromagnetic radiation emitted
by an object. 4 "All objects with temperatures above absolute
zero naturally emit a broad spectrum of electromagnetic radiation,
the details of which are determined by the material and surface
properties of the object, as characterized by its emissivity, and by
its temperature." 7  Millivision and its accompanying "image-un-
derstanding software" read this electromagnetic radiation and con-
vert the radiation into a visual image, similar to an X-ray ma-
chine. 76 Unlike X-rays, however, which are unable to detect
drugs or the modem components of bomb and weapon manufac-
turing, Millivision is able to specifically identify most objects be-
cause of the different emissions of various materials.77 For ex-
ample, an individual's clothing is virtually transparent to Mill-
vision, while a person's body is an especially good emitter of elec-
tromagnetic radiation. Different sorts of metals and plastics are
somewhere in between.78 Also unlike X-ray detectors, Millivision
is passive and does not expose the subject to any man-made elec-
tromagnetic fields or other radiation from the imaging system.'79
Millivision is intended to be used primarily by law enforce-
ment officers, usually to conduct "remote frisks" of individuals to
detect the presence of concealed weapons."8 A patrolman could
operate the device from his car to examine an individual on the
street from a substantial distance without having to leave the vehi-
cle or physically "search" the individual-and without the
174. See Reducing Gun Violence: Testimony to the Crime and Criminal Justice
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1994) (statement of Dr.
G. Richard Huguenin, President of Millitech Corporation), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Cong. Test. File [hereinafter Huguenin Testimony].
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See Goossens, supra note 2, at 9.
178. See Huguenin Testimony, supra note 174. Metals are very poor emitters, while
various plastics exhibit emission properties between flesh and metals. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.; see also Goossens, supra note 2, at 9; Erik Milstone, New Devices Let
Frisk Go Undercover: Agency Pushes Effort While Critics Worry About Trampling Privacy
Rights, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 32; Joyce Price, 'X-ray' Camera Could Reveal Criminal
Intent; Civil Libertarians See Privacy Problems, WASH. TMES, Aug. 13, 1996, at Al.
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individual's knowledge.'8' Millivision is also capable of detecting
contraband other than traditional metal weapons concealed on
individuals, including non-metallic weapons, electronic devices, and
explosives."s Using "smart" software, Millivision could be pro-
grammed to recognize certain shapes and indicate to the operator
if one of those shapes has been detected by the machine."8' For
example, the software could be programmed to recognize dry pow-
ders or liquids in plastic bags, vials, or other containers.I 4 While
Millivision could not determine the chemical properties of the
powder or liquid, it could alert the operator of the possibility of
the presence of drugs, and the operator could conduct a further
investigation."8
Millitech Corporation, with $1.4 million in grants from the
federal government, 86 has developed a small hand-held Mili-
vision camera for remote detection and is developing a larger,
fixed-installation camera for airports and other entranceways.11
A prototype has already been developed, and regular production is
scheduled to begin this year."8
C. Millivision and the Constitution
The constitutionality of a warrantless Millivision scan must be
analyzed under the framework of the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, as well as the recent circuit court deci-
sions on thermal imaging technology. Because Millivision is similar
to thermal imaging in that it is a passive and physically unintrusive
surveillance technology, the same analysis used in the thermal im-
aging cases should apply. Thus, the determination of whether such
a scan constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, and
consequently is subject to a warrant requirement, is likely to be
based on whether the scan reveals "intimate details."




185. See Goossens, supra note 2, at 9.
186. See Price, supra note 180, at Al. Funding for the camera came from the US
Army and Air Force and from two international corporations. See Huguenin Testimony,
supra note 174.
187. See Huguenin Testimony, supra note 174.
188. Price, supra note 180, at Al.
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Although Millivision does literally see through clothing, "the
resulting display does not reveal intimate anatomical details of the
person."'" Using the "smart" software discussed earlier,"9  Milli-
vision could be set so that a person with no suspicious objects
could be cleared automatically without operator intervention and
without an image being displayed.'91 Only if the operator is
alerted to the presence of a "suspicious" object would an image be
displayed at all, and the resolution is not clear enough to see "the
contours of breasts, buttocks and genitals."'"
Since a Millivision scan would not reveal a person's "intimate
anatomical details,"" a warrantless scan would only be unconsti-
tutional if it revealed the "intimate details" of something carried
on the person. However, since the scan only displays the outline
of these objects, as opposed to their content, in most cases the
scan would not reveal anything the Court would consider "inti-
mate."'94 For example, if an individual was carrying a diary or
political manifesto, Millivision could presumably detect the outline
of the book or papers, but could not detect the content of the
writings. This seems to be the same distinction the majority made
with respect to pen registers in Smith v. Maryland.95 While the
Court held the content of the telephone conversation itself was
private, the telephone number dialed, that is, to whom the call was
placed, was not an "intimate detail" worthy of Fourth Amendment
protection. 9 6 Similarly, the warrantless thermal imaging counte-
nanced by the circuit courts is capable of revealing "hot spots,"
but not the specific content of the structures from which those
spots emit, and thus does "not reveal any intimate details."'"
189. Huguenin Testimony, supra note 174. The precise abilities of Millivision are cur-
rently under some debate. See Price, supra note 180, at Al.
190. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
191. See iL
192. Price, supra note 180, at Al.
193. Huguenin Testimony, supra note 174.
194. While the Court has used the language of the "intimate details" analysis on
several occasions, it has yet to define the standard. See supra notes 82-86 and accompa-
nying text. What is apparent from the Court's jurisprudence is that the important factor
is the content of the objects revealed. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-46
(1979) (distinguishing between the pen register which was capable of revealing only the
telephone numbers dialed, which was held not to amount to a "search," and the conver-
sation itself, in Katz, which was deemed worthy of Fourth Amendment protection).
195. 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); see supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
196. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
197. See supra notes 104-42 and accompanying text (discussing the "intimate details"
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While one might be able to envisage some objects that by their
outline alone reveal "intimate details,"'98 this would not be the
norm.
Similarly, if courts continue to adhere to the "intimate details"
standard as it has developed in the cases subsequent to Katz, they
will hold that a warrantless Millivision scan does not constitute a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. An electromagnetic scan
would only reveal suspicious objects which are outside of the
scope of the "intimate details" standard.' 9 At this point, the
court's inquiry would end and there would be no constitutional
protection for individuals against arbitrary and indiscriminate Milli-
vision scans.
At least one commentator has urged that a Millivision "frisk"
should be subject to the same restrictions as a traditional stop-and-
frisk by police.' The standards for a stop-and-frisk arose in the
Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, ' where the Court held that
before engaging in a traditional frisk, the police officer must have
a "reasonable suspicion" that the person with whom he is dealing
is armed and dangerous.- The Court established that the "stop-
and-frisk" was a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment'.a Because the Court considered the search
test as used by the circuit courts in evaluating the constitutionality of thermal scans of
private residences).
198. Such objects could include religious symbols or sexual paraphernalia, to name just
two possibilities. Under the Court's analysis, if "intimate details" are revealed about an
individual, then the search might be deemed unconstitutional. See Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 452 (1989). However, this finding would have no bearing on the constitutional-.
ity of the technology in general, as the analysis seems to be based on individual consid-
erations. See hi
199. See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 450-52 (holding that marijuana was not an "intimate
detail" worthy of constitutional protection); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15
(1986) (same).
200. See Milstone, supra note 180, at 33 (citing David A. Harris, law professor at the
University of Toledo College of Law).
201. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
202. See id. at 30.
203. See ri- at 15. The Court explained:
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person
which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for
crime--"arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has "seized" that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the Eng-
lish language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a
person's clothing all over his body in an attempt to find weapons is not a
"search."
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and seizure only minimally intrusive,' it proceeded to determine
whether the "search and seizure were unreasonable."' 5 This "in-
quiry" is a dual one-whether the officer's action was justified at
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.0 6
This dual inquiry involved balancing the interests of the law en-
forcement officer in protecting himself against the intrusiveness of
the search to the individual.'
In the Millivision context, however, there are several crucial
distinctions from the traditional Terry frisk. In Terry, the Court
recognized that a traditional frisk involved a "seizure" and thus
directly implicated the Fourth Amendment.s A typical Milli-
vision scan would be physically unintrusive; there would be no
"seizure" of the person, and an individual's freedom would not be
restrained. As such, constitutional protections would only be impli-
cated if there was a "search." As discussed above, because the
scan would not reveal intimate details, a Millivision scan would
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. As such, a
Millivision scan is inherently different from a "Terry stop," and
the same standards do not apply. Thus, an individual would most
likely be afforded no constitutional protection from warrantless,
arbitrary Millivision "frisks."
IV. MONITORING THE GOVERNMENT'S USE OF
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
If the Court formally adopts an "intimate details" standard for
determining whether a particular government surveillance tech-
nique constituted a "search" protected by the Fourth Amendment,
a vital component would be to ensure that this standard was being
"scrupulously" honored by law enforcement. 9 Thermal imaging
technology has the capability of distinguishing heat sources in very
precise gradations: current technology can detect the tear ducts on
a face.210 It would not be difficult "to identify (if not, strictly
Id. at 16.
204. See id. at 26.
205. Id. at 29-30.
206. Id. at 19-20.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 16-17.
209. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987) (arguing that police searches
must be "scrupulously" subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry).
210. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531 (W.D. Wis. 1994); supra
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speaking, to watch) two people making love in the privacy of their
darkened bedroom., 211 Presumably, "watching" two people mak-
ing love would be an "intimate detail" protected by the Fourth
Amendment.212 We hope that the government will exercise great
discretion in employing such technology, 21 but "the very exis-
tence of such discretion would run afoul of the Constitution." 214
The purpose of the warrant requirement is to interpose some
judicial impartiality between law enforcement and the citizens. 15
Since it would be unconstitutional to leave such technology in the
hands of law enforcement absent some impartial constraints, two
such restraints will now be briefly considered: 1) limiting law en-
forcement to technology that is not capable of revealing intimate
details; and 2) placing the burden on the government at trial to
prove that in its search for evidence, no "intimate details" were
revealed.
A. Limiting the Technology Available to Police
In the marketplace for surveillance equipment, within each
technology there are machines with different capabilities and levels
of accuracy.216 For example, the available thermal imaging devic-
notes 91-103 and accompanying text (discussing the technological capabilities of thermal
imaging devices).
211. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1502, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995) vacated on
reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996); see also State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595
(1994) (noting that thermal imagers can detect "a human form through an open [cur-
tained] window when the person is leaning against [the] curtain" or a person leaning
against a plywood door).
212. See, eg., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If
the police had observed Riley embracing his wife in the backyard greenhouse, would we
say that his reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed?"); United States v.
Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding to the district court for findings
on whether the thermal imaging device can "detect sexual activity in the bedroom").
213. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1504.
214. Id. at 1504; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (arguing
that notwithstanding facts showing probable cause, police officers must first obtain a war-
rant, because "the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a
judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police"') (citations omit-
ted); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-27 (1886) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment was passed as a result of the arbitrary and discretionary powers of revenue
agents pursuant to the Writs of Assistance in colonial times).
215. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (noting that a "fun-
damental premise" of the warrant is review by a "neutral and detached" magistrate).
216. See Mindy G. Wilson, Note, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This
Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth Amend-
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es vary in sensitivity and accuracy.217 Some of them are capable
of only grossly distinguishing "hot spots" on the exterior of build-
ings; others can identify the movement of a human body through
underbrush and foliage,2 1 ' and still others have a range of capa-
bilities.219 The Court could choose to hold that so long as the
device could only vaguely detect hot spots and was incapable of
revealing human forms or other details it considered intimate, the
surveillance would not constitute a "search." This eminently plausi-
ble solution would limit the capacity of the government to enhance
the technology to a point that revealed too much.
This solution would be compatible with the "canine sniff" held
constitutional in United States v. Place.'- In Place, the Court
held that the investigative procedure of subjecting luggage to a
canine "sniff test" by a well-trained narcotics detection dog does
not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.' The relative "unintrusiveness" of the canine sniff
was important to the Court's analysis, as was the fact that the
canine sniff is limited in its disclosure to the detection of illegal
contraband and does not expose "non-contraband" items to public
view.m Thus, the Court could limit the government's use of pas-
sive surveillance to searches tailored to discover specific sorts of
contraband.' The Court could limit the use of thermal imaging
technology, for instance, solely to thermal scans for "hot spots."
Similarly, if a Millivision scan were targeted so that it revealed
only the presence or absence of weapons, illegal narcotics, or other
contraband, the technology would seem closely analogous to the
"sniff' test. This solution appears to be conceptually similar not
only to Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Place, but also to
ment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 KY. LJ. 891, 897-98 (1995) (discuss-
ing the technological capabilities of thermal imaging devices).
217. See id. at 897-98.
218. See Cusunano, 67 F,3d at 1504.
219. See Wilson, supra note 216, at 897-98.
220. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
221. See id. at 706-07. A "sniff-test" involves a police dog smelling a closed piece of
luggage for odors of certain kinds of contraband, usually narcotics. See id.
222. See id. at 707.
223. While the canine sniff is discriminating in its ability to disclose any details of the
individual, in that the dog detects only contraband items, the thermal scan has the capa-
bility of revealing innocent conduct as well as the presence of marijuana. Cf. United
States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504-05, 1505 n.14 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on reh'g
en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (remanding case for a determination of whether
thermal imagery could reveal innocent activity, such as baking cookies).
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Chief Justice Burger's statement in Dow that the EPA "was not
employing some unique sensory device that, for example, could
penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversations."'
Chief Justice Burger seems to have implicitly acknowledged that
the Court must engage in some sort of analysis of the specific
technologies used by the government to determine which were
violative of the Fourth Amendment.
While the requirement that the Court analyze the technology
used would address the concerns that surveillance might reveal too
much, this judicial scrutiny raises many issues. For example, involv-
ing the courts in the constant monitoring of new technologies and
making determinations of the level of intrusion of each brand and
model of a specific technology are activities that the Court, Justice
Burger's comments notwithstanding,' would most likely be re-
luctant to perform. However, should the district courts begin to
make factual findings, like the district court in Kyllo,2  that "no
intimate details" are revealed by a particular technology,227 the
appellate courts would have an easier time finding such "searches"
constitutional. Similarly, should the Court explicitly adopt an "inti-
mate details" standard that places limits on the specificity revealed
by the technology, law enforcement might understand this as an
admonition to use self-restraint in their use of high-tech surveil-
lance.
B. Placing the Burden of Proof on the Government
Currently, the burden at trial is on the defendant to prove
that he had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" that was violat-
ed by specific police conduct.22 However, the Court could shift
the burden by requiring the state to prove that its technological
surveillance technique did not observe "intimate details" raising
constitutional concerns. 9 If this were the case, on a motion to
224. Id. at 238.
225. See id.
226. United States v. Kyllo, No. CR. 92-51-FR., 1996 WL 125594 (D. Or. March 15,
1996).
227. Id. at *2.
228. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1961)); see also United States v. Evans, 27
F.3d 1221, 1228 (7th Cir. 1994).
229. Many areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence contain similar examples of
burden-shifting. In the context of automobile searches, while the defendant bears the
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suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant, the gov-
ernment would have to prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that their activity in gaining probable cause to secure the
warrant did not inadvertently reveal these details. This burden-
shifting might be a logical step, especially since the government ac-
tivity in question will most likely be surreptitious in nature, and
the individual will have little chance of knowing she is being
"searched," let alone whether the government activity revealed
"intimate details." Instead, the government would be forced to
record the searches and produce this recording in its entirety at
trial. The court could then review the recording and determine
whether "intimate details" were revealed"3 Examples of how
this solution might be applied include displaying pictures or video
taken by the surveillance, as was done in Dow."3 Similarly, most
other technologically advanced surveillance is recorded by comput-
er, video, or some other recording device. The officers who claim
their warrantless surveillance activities did not reveal "intimate
details" would thus have possession of the proof. It would then be
for the court to examine the video, pictures, or stored computer
images, and to determine if any such details are revealed. Placing
the burden of proof on the government would put the onus on
law enforcement to ensure continued custody of the surveillance
records and it would provide a procedural safeguard to secure
some degree of protection to individuals who would be subjected
to warrantless government surveillance.
It would be important to ensure that this burden-shifting is
not emasculated by the good faith exception to the warrant re-
quirement, which holds that if the police reasonably believe that
the warrant under which they have acted is valid, the exclusionary
rule will not apply to bar the items seized from being introduced
at the trial of the person whose rights were violated by the
search."2 The police would be held accountable for ensuring that
burden of showing that a search occurred, the government must show that consent was
given for the search. See United States v. Flores, 48 F.3d 467, 468 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1995).
230. Objections about the cumbersomeness of such a review could be addressed by
allowing defense attorneys to edit the recording.
231. See Dow, 476 U.S. at 238 (indicating a review of the photographs when the
Court stated that "the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to
raise constitutional concerns").
232. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925-26 (1984).
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they did not observe any "intimate details" in their activity, and as
such could not believe in "good faith" that they had a valid war-
rant predicated on that information if they did so observe.
CONCLUSION
A review of recent Supreme Court decisions reveals the emer-
gence of a new standard to determine whether government surveil-
lance constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. This "intimate details" test has appeared in reaction
to the evolution of newer, less physically intrusive government
surveillance techniques. Its central inquiry is whether the surveil-
lance activity at issue is "so revealing of intimate details as to
raise constitutional concerns." 3 Using this approach, the Court
has refused to extend Fourth Amendment scrutiny to a number of
new and powerful surveillance techniques available to the govern-
ment.
Should the Court choose to formally adopt this "intimate
details" standard, Fourth Amendment protections we currently
enjoy will be substantially threatened. The Court has not provided
a sufficient definition of "intimate details," and, as a consequence,
neither law enforcement nor individuals know the parameters of
the standard. As it stands, we will be protected only if a particular
content of our activities is revealed. Adding to this uncertainty is
the fact that the surreptitious nature of these searches makes it
unlikely that we will understand the full extent and intrusiveness
of the surveillance, or even that it is taking place. It is vital that
conceptual and procedural safeguards be established to protect
fundamental expectations of privacy, as the drafters of the Fourth
Amendment originally intended. Such protections might include
limiting the capacity of the technology and placing the burden of
proof on the government to demonstrate that the surveillance
revealed no "intimate details." At issue is "how tightly the Fourth
Amendment permits people to be driven back into the recesses of
their lives by the risk of surveillance."' Under current law,
powerful surveillance technologies like thermal imaging and
Millivision are entirely permissible, and the recesses of our homes
233. Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
234. Riley, 488 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Amsterdam, supra note 27,
at 402).
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are not secure from government prying. Certainly, the Fourth
Amendment means more than this.
